Alter vs Britive for AI agents
Britive sells runtime privileged access with no standing privileges. Instead of a role that sits on an account indefinitely, a person, a service account or an AI agent checks out a profile, gets the permissions it needs in AWS, Azure, GCP, OCI, Kubernetes or a SaaS admin plane, and has them removed when the task finishes or the timer runs out.
For agents, Britive has gone further than the checkout. Britive ARC evaluates agent actions at runtime, and its MCP Gateway intercepts each tool call to the MCP servers an organization registers, decides it on the tool, the arguments and the target, and can park a sensitive one until someone approves it in Slack, Teams or email. That is real per-action control, and the table below credits it.
Alter works on a different stretch of the agent's traffic: its direct HTTPS calls to third-party APIs such as Google, Salesforce, Stripe and GitHub, made with an OAuth grant or API key Alter holds. Every one of those requests passes through Alter, is allowed, refused or held for a named approver based on its endpoint and parameters, and leaves an audit row either way. On that proxy path there is no window to open, because the agent is never handed a permission to spend; a key given Alter's token-retrieval scope is the exception, which is why agents get proxy-only keys.
Alter and Britive, capability by capability
Every mark that is not a plain yes carries the sentence that explains it and a link to Britive's own documentation.
| Capability | Alter | Britive |
|---|---|---|
| Credentials | ||
| Injects the credential into the outbound call | Partial For registered MCP servers, the platform holds the downstream credential and releases it to the MCP Gateway for a single call, so the gateway makes that call credentialed. For other targets, Britive raises the identity's permissions inside the target or mints a short-lived credential, and the identity then makes its own calls. Source (opens in a new tab) | |
| The agent never holds the third-party token | Partial Calls routed through the proxy, and every call from a proxy-only key, never expose the token. A key granted the token-retrieval scope can fetch it, so issue agents proxy-only keys. | Partial Britive's agent page says the agent never holds a privileged credential, and behind the MCP Gateway that is the design. Where a target needs a credential it is created on request and destroyed when the task ends; a programmatic profile checkout, the path for scripts and the CLI, hands short-term keys to whoever checked it out. Source (opens in a new tab) |
| Providers supported out of the box | 137 | 19 target types The docs carry onboarding guides for 19 application types — among them AWS, Azure, GCP, OCI, Kubernetes, Salesforce, ServiceNow, Snowflake, Google Workspace, Okta and a custom application — plus whichever MCP servers you register. These are targets whose access Britive manages, not third-party APIs it calls for an agent, so the number is not like-for-like with Alter's. Source (opens in a new tab) |
| Policy | ||
| Policy evaluated per outbound call, down to the parameter | Partial Through the MCP Gateway, yes: every tool call is decided on the identity, the tool, the arguments, the target and the conditions of the request. Where an agent is instead given raised permissions or a short-lived credential for a target, the decision is taken once, when access for the task is granted. Source (opens in a new tab) | |
| Default deny: an unlisted endpoint is refused | ||
| Control | ||
| A named human approves a specific pending call before it runs | ||
| Each agent is a distinct principal with its own keys | ||
| Revoking one agent cuts its access without rotating others | ||
| Evidence | ||
| An audit row for every credential-touching request | Partial Each authorization decision, privilege creation and revocation is recorded and streamed to a SIEM, and gateway calls are logged with the tool and arguments. Once permissions have been raised inside a target, the pages read do not describe Britive recording each call the agent then makes there. Source (opens in a new tab) | |
| End users can see and revoke what an agent may do for them | — ARC's policy weighs the identity an agent acts for, but the pages read describe consoles for administrators, requesters and approvers only — no view where that person sees or withdraws what the agent may do for them. Source (opens in a new tab) | |
Comparison accurate as of September 23, 2026, based onBritive's public documentation. Products change: if something here is out of date, tell us athello@alterauth.com and we will correct it.
- Britive: MCP Gateway (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: Countdown to Top 5 PyBritive Features, Check-Out Modes (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: Agentic AI Identity Security (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: Agentic AI Identity Security (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: ARC, Agentic Runtime Control (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive Docs: Application Onboarding Guides (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive Docs: My Approvals (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: Agentic AI Security (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: JIT Permissioning (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
- Britive: Integrations (opens in a new tab) — read September 23, 2026
Britive is a trademark of Britive, Inc.. Alter is not affiliated with or endorsed by Britive, Inc..
Opening a window, or ruling on each request
Britive's founding idea is the access window. A profile is checked out, perhaps after a manager approves the justification; the identity holds real permissions in the target until check-in or expiry; then those permissions are gone. That shrinks how long privilege exists, and it is a large improvement on standing admin roles. Inside the window, though, the identity may do anything the permissions allow. Britive's answer for agents is to cut the window down to a single action where it can, at the MCP Gateway. On its proxy path Alter never opens a window: the agent names a grant rather than holding its token, and <strong>each HTTP request</strong> to the third-party API is checked against endpoint and parameters before Alter injects the credential and sends it.
- Britive: permission exists for the length of a task, then is removed.
- Britive ARC: MCP tool calls through the gateway are decided one at a time.
- Alter: every call to a SaaS API is decided on its own, with nothing left open between calls.
- Alter: a held call reaches its named approver as a redacted summary of that exact request.
Your cloud estate versus your users' SaaS accounts
Britive's targets belong to the organization — its cloud accounts, clusters, databases and the MCP servers it sanctions — and the gateway runs inside your network so connections originate there. Alter's usual target is a third party's API reached with a grant a person connected: this user's Gmail, that customer's Salesforce org. That is why Alter keeps a catalogue of providers it can call, why the grant is scoped to the user who authorized it, and why that user can see and revoke the agent's access in the Alter wallet. Teams with both problems can run both products: Britive for privilege in their own estate, Alter for the calls agents make into accounts they do not own.
When Britive is the better choice
A comparison that never reaches this section is a brochure.
Zero standing privileges across clouds
Britive creates permissions in AWS, Azure, GCP, OCI, Kubernetes and SaaS platforms when they are needed and revokes them when the task completes, so a stolen identity finds nothing standing. Alter does not touch cloud IAM at all; if the risk is permanent admin roles in your cloud estate, Britive addresses it and Alter does not.
One policy framework for every identity
People, service accounts, pipelines and agents are governed through a common policy framework and one view of who holds what. Alter governs agents and the third-party grants they use, not an engineer's console session or a CI job's cloud role.
Agentless and quick to stand up
Britive manages most targets through their native APIs from its SaaS platform, with nothing to install, and says a rollout across AWS, Azure, GCP and on-prem resources takes hours rather than weeks. Alter needs the agent's API traffic routed through its SDK or proxy before it can govern anything.
Questions people ask
Is Alter a replacement for Britive?
No. Britive removes standing privilege from cloud, infrastructure and SaaS administration for people, machines and agents, which Alter does not attempt. Alter governs the calls agents make to third-party APIs with credentials it holds, and fits alongside a Britive deployment rather than instead of one.
Britive also authorizes MCP tool calls. Where does Alter differ?
On MCP traffic through its gateway, Britive decides each tool call on its arguments and can hold it for approval, so the two overlap there. Alter's ground is the agent's direct REST calls to SaaS providers on a connected user's behalf, with a provider catalogue, per-user grants and an audit row for every request.
Does Alter grant just-in-time cloud permissions?
No. Alter does not create or remove roles in AWS, Azure, GCP or Kubernetes. If you need engineers or pipelines to receive time-boxed cloud privilege, that is what Britive is for.
Can I self-host Alter?
Yes. Besides its managed cloud, Alter can be deployed on-premises. Britive's platform is delivered as SaaS, though its MCP Gateway runs inside your own network.
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